Postwar Reconstruction, the Reverse Course and the New Way Forward: Bis Repetitas? by Bridoux, Jeff
Aberystwyth University
Postwar Reconstruction, the Reverse Course and the New Way Forward: Bis
Repetitas?
Bridoux, Jeff
Published in:
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding
DOI:
10.1080/17502977.2011.541782
Publication date:
2011
Citation for published version (APA):
Bridoux, J. (2011). Postwar Reconstruction, the Reverse Course and the New Way Forward: Bis Repetitas?
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 5(1), 43-66. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2011.541782
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Aberystwyth Research Portal (the Institutional Repository) are
retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the
legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Aberystwyth Research Portal for the purpose of private study or
research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Aberystwyth Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
tel: +44 1970 62 2400
email: is@aber.ac.uk
Download date: 09. Jul. 2020
  
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
This article was downloaded by: [Bridoux, Jeff][Aberystwyth University]
On: 18 April 2011
Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 932638591]
Publisher Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-
41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t741771150
Postwar Reconstruction, the Reverse Course and the New Way Forward:
Bis Repetitas?
Jeff Bridouxa
a Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales
Online publication date: 28 March 2011
To cite this Article Bridoux, Jeff(2011) 'Postwar Reconstruction, the Reverse Course and the New Way Forward: Bis
Repetitas?', Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 5: 1, 43 — 66
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/17502977.2011.541782
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2011.541782
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or
distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses
should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,
actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly
or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Postwar Reconstruction, the Reverse
Course and the New Way Forward: Bis
Repetitas?
Jeff Bridoux
This paper compares two sets of US-led postwar reconstruction strategies: the
Reverse Course in Japan after World War II and the New Way Forward in Iraq in
2007 and 2008. Relying on Antonio Gramsci’s concept of power, the article
argues that in the wake of military victory in Japan and Iraq, the US attempted
to found a new historical bloc in the occupied countries, a historical bloc centred
on capitalism as a mode of production and US ideas and values as the ideological
cement coalescing the Japanese and Iraqi population and elite around the US
project. The paper contends that consistency of action between reconstruc-
tion policies, and between reconstruction policies and regional and global
foreign policies, is the key to the efficiency of postwar reconstruction projects.
Consistency of action refers to the maximisation of power resources and to their
use in a coherent way; that is avoiding opposition and favouring complementa-
rities between means of power used. Such consistency was achieved in Japan
while its attainment in Iraq is less obvious.
Keywords postwar reconstruction; Iraq; Japan; Antonio Gramsci; New Way
Forward
It is the purpose of this article to compare two US-led postwar reconstruction
strategies: the Reverse Course between 1947 and 1952 in Japan and the New Way
Forward between January 2007 and July 2008 in Iraq. It is argued that both sets of
policies were born out of local, regional and global security issues affecting the
status of the United States as global power. Indeed, both policies are the
offspring of a US grand strategy of global primacy pursued since the early 1940s
(Williams 1959, Liska 1967, Aron 1982, Layne 2006). However, both the Reverse
Course and the New Way Forward deviated from a focus on security to adopt a
holistic approach to the challenges faced in Japan and Iraq. Indeed, the US
government developed strategies aiming at simultaneous progress in the security,
political, economic, and civil society spheres of occupied countries. In other
words, in addition to a narrowly construed definition of security focusing
on military and material capabilities, US officials added concepts such as
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interdependency (taking into account regional realities), shared values, sociali-
sation and identity, in order to achieve success in their reconstruction projects.
By analysing similarities and differences between the two cases, this article
intends to assess the measure of success of the change of policy in Iraq.
Considering that the Reverse Course can be qualified as a success of American
foreign policy, we use this case as a benchmark against which the New Way Forward
is compared. Success is defined here as the achievement of stated US foreign
policy objectives in relation to the reconstruction policies implemented.
Antonio Gramsci (1971) offers several concepts that are relevant to under-
standing why postwar reconstruction succeeds or fails: organic intellectuals (in
the definition of reconstruction policies), a historical bloc (the formulation and
implementation of policies aiming at the acquisition of consent to US reconstruc-
tion projects, with the ultimate aim to ensure consent to US hegemony in
reconstructed countries), the state (political society and civil society), and his
concept of power, differentiating between power expressed through coercion
and power as consent-based. We apply these concepts to the achievements of
both sets of policies across four fields of reconstruction: the security, the
economy, the state, and civil society.
Moreover, while not explicitly formulated by Gramsci but implicitly apparent
in his writing on the ideological cohesion needed to build up a new historical
bloc, it is argued here that the idea of ‘consistency of action’ in the making of a
new historical bloc is another explanatory factor to be considered, as it is
identified as paramount to the efficiency of reconstruction projects as a whole.
Hence, in the case of postwar reconstruction, consistency of action between
reconstruction policies, and between reconstruction policies and regional and
global foreign policies is the key to success. Consistency of action, similar to
Nye’s (2009) concept of smart power, refers to the maximisation of power
resources and to their use in a coherent way that is avoiding opposition and
favouring complementarities between means of power used (Bridoux 2011, p. 5).
This article opens with an examination of the context and origins of the
Reverse Course and the New Way Forward. It is contended that both changes of
policy were generated by pressures from special interests groups; more
accurately, in their perception that the security of the United States regionally
and globally, and hence its status as global superpower, was at stake. In addition
to concerns regarding the regional and global US position of power, security and
stability in the reconstructed country was paramount to the efficient deployment
of reconstruction policies.
The second section applies Gramsci’s concepts of power and historical bloc to
the Reverse Course and the New Way Forward, looking at the content and impact
of these new policies across the four fields mentioned above (security, economy,
state, civil society). Using Gramsci’s insights and the concept of ‘consistency’ as
indicators, the realisations of the policies in each of these fields are analysed.
The final section assesses the outcome of the Reverse Course and the New Way
Forward and offers an explanation of their successes and failures in terms of
power.
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Context and Origins
Two sets of factors explain the change of reconstruction policies in Japan and
Iraq: the perception of a threat to American security and status as global
superpower and the organisation of a response to this threat by special interest
groups, acting de facto as Gramscian organic intellectuals, formulating elements
of a new policy embodying their ideas and values regarding the role of the US in
Japan and Iraq, and by extension, in the region and in the global order (see
Parmar 2002).
A postwar reconstruction project can be seen as the construction of a new
historical bloc in an occupied country, translating into the instillation of liberal
capitalism as a new mode of functioning destined to replace the authoritarianism
of the toppled regimes. In so doing, the United States tried to empower a
capitalist elite in tune with Washington’s objectives of recasting both Japan and
Iraq in the liberal capitalist democratic world while preserving the newborn
democratic institutions, themselves protecting the rule of the capitalist
bourgeoisie over the masses in these two revived countries (Dodge 2009). In so
doing, the US aims at creating a new ‘historical bloc’ in occupied countries,
characterised by an interactive process in which the potential hegemon presents
its policies as being in the interests of the targeted subordinate actor(s). It has to
incorporate the subordinate’s interests and accordingly make the necessary
concessions in its programme for hegemony in order to obtain the consent of the
less powerful (Showstack Sassoon 1982, p. 111). A historical bloc requires what
Gramsci terms ‘organic intellectuals’. They cement the links between structures
and superstructures by producing and organising ideology (Gramsci 1971, p. 5,
Gill 1986, p. 210). Intellectuals are in charge of the formulation of a message
able to gain consent to the ideology of the ruling class and to the organisation and
running of the governmental apparatus. These two functions correspond to the
dual composition of the superstructure: civil society (private sphere) and
political society (the state), corresponding to the two functions of hegemony
exercised throughout society and direct domination through the governmental
apparatus (Gramsci 1971, p. 12). These intellectuals are described as ‘organic’ by
Gramsci. They do not constitute a social class on their own but are the
‘organically’ linked thinking and organising elements of a fundamental social
class. In addition to the two previous functions, their main function is to direct
the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they ‘organically’ belong by
forging, as they do for the whole society, a common identity. In the case of the
reconstruction of Japan and Iraq, two sets of ‘organic intellectuals’ can be
identified acting in two different ways: 1. the personnel of the occupation
authorities and Washington-based officials who formulated the policies that
structured the reconstruction of the occupied country through the production of
a new state apparatus and the definition of an organising ideology aiming at its
perpetuation; 2. the local elite (politicians, civil servants, businessmen) across
the political and civil societies, trained and politically indoctrinated to
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perpetuate and secure the ideas and values that cement the historic bloc:
freedom, democracy, capitalism and free markets.
The appropriation of Gramscian concepts in International Relations studies is a
contested approach. Indeed, the conceptual appropriation of Gramsci’s work by
the Italian School generated objections in terms of the viability of the
interpretation of Gramsci’s work, the applicability of his key concepts to the
study of international relations*especially the concept of a global civil society
(Joseph 2002, Jessop 2003)*the relevancy of Gramsci’s concepts to under-
standing the contemporary social order (Germain and Kenny 1998), a weakness in
the applicability of Gramscian ideas to concrete situations (Ayres 2008, Worth
2008, 2011, Worth and Murray 2009), and a reduction of the role of structures in
the making of hegemony through an over-emphasis on agential interaction
(Bhashkar 1991, Joseph 2002).
Interpreting Gramsci is a difficult enterprise given the conflicting influences
that characterised his life and his work, and the particularly appalling conditions
in which he wrote his key texts, The Prison Notebooks. Moreover, the
appropriation of Gramscian insights by the Italian School is not without problems.
Indeed, key Gramscian concepts have been de-contextualised and hence
misunderstood in their application, as Germain and Kenny (1998, pp. 8,
1516) contend about the concepts of civil society and hegemony (Rupert
1998). These critiques insist on the lack of operationalisation of Gramscian ideas
in the study of international relations or, to be more accurate, in the difficulty of
‘globalising’ Gramsci’s ideas. Indeed, operationally speaking, the process of their
application has sometimes been described as ‘amorphous’ (James and Lake 1989)
and the neo-Gramscian transformative and ethical objective of analysing the
global civil society counter-hegemonic movements resisting and attempting to
transform a global neoliberal capitalist order falls short of uncovering global
mechanisms of ideological dissemination, which in turn ‘calls the whole idea of
global hegemony into question’ (Femia 2005, p. 343).
The objective of this study does not consist in an attempt to read and apply
Gramsci’s concepts to the global political order and to investigate the existence
and functioning of a global hegemonic transnational managerial class aiming at
universalising a dominant capitalist mode of production. Rather, it aims
at looking at how a concept of power influenced by Gramsci’s statement that
power is coercion and consent contributes to understanding the outcome of
national and international dynamics at play in the cases of the reconstruction of
Japan and Iraq.
The Reverse Course: Global Challenges and Making Use of the Intellect of
Organic Lobbyists
American reconstruction policies in Japan experienced a U-turn in 1947 to adjust
to global and regional factors. At the global level, Soviet domination in Eastern
Europe and assertiveness in other parts of the world, especially in the Middle East
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and the Mediterranean; the economic crisis shaking Western Europe and the need
for extended American involvement in that region; and the US policy of operating
in an open, global, capitalist framework, all concurred in the definition of a new
role for Japan. Regionally, the looming collapse of China into Communist hands,
the sorry state of the economy in the Far East, and the desperate economic
conditions in Japan were perfect conditions for a swing of the whole region
towards Moscow. Washington reacted by offering to Japan what it had gone to
war for: economic interdependence with Asia. A number of US top officials got
organised to secure East Asia to American interests by making Japan the bulwark
of the fight against Communism in the region. To reach this objective, the US
literally created a new historical bloc in Japan, built on capitalism as the mode of
production and cemented by an organising ideology founded on democratic
liberalism, spreading across Japanese civil society. Illustrating the importance
interest groups can have in the formulation of US foreign policy, these officials
could rely on the American Council on Japan (ACJ), initiated in August 1948 by
Howard Kern, the virulent anti-Communist editor of Newsweek. He made use of
his numerous contacts inside the occupation and with Japanese officials ‘to
inform the American public and to assist the Truman Administration in solving
those problems that must be solved if victory in Japan is to be assured’
(Schonberger 1989, pp. 144145).
Although the ACJ was a small and loosely structured pressure group, its
members were among the most ardent participants in the debate over Japanese
policy, providing ideological, strategic, and economic rationales for the creation
of a new capitalistic structure in Japan. The peace and security treaties marked
the culmination of efforts by the Japan lobby to reverse the reformist orientation
of the early occupation, to make Japan a bulwark against Communism in Asia,
and to rivet Japan into an American-dominated world capitalist system
(Schonberger 1977, 1989, pp. 159160, Lafeber 1997, p. 275). The ACJ was
opposed to the socialistic ideals of the economic doctrine applied in Japan,
attacked the policies of de-concentration of economic power, and particularly
the purge programme, applied by MacArthur, on the grounds that the removal of
leading figures in industry, commerce, and finance would disrupt the economic
recovery. The ACJ organised the dissemination of these opinions in Japan and the
United States by creating networks of communication between Japanese and US
officials, and by arranging conferences with media professionals, academics,
business leaders, and public opinion leaders for the spreading and acceptance of
its objective in the United States and in Japan, especially through the influence
of General Robert L. Eichelberger (1947, Reel 36, 1947 Diaries), who was
sympathetic to the ACJ’s thesis, considering that nothing in Japan had been done
to counter the interests of the Russians. Eichelberger would soon become the
main point of entry for ACJ’s members’ and American officials’ contacts with
Japanese policy-makers, bankers and industrialists favourable to their views.
In this way, the ACJ and its supporters acted as organic intellectuals, defining
new directions to be taken by reconstruction policies in Japan in order to secure
the new historical bloc created by the US, with capitalism as the mode of
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production, and liberalism as the ideological cement binding the Japanese state
to its civil society. This process was further solidified through the permanent
injection of American ideas and values across the Japanese political and civil
societies, buttressing the hegemony of liberal capitalism in the country. Japanese
and American officials, influenced or reinforced in their opinions by the activities
of the ACJ, thus set off to change the design of the occupation. Their objectives
were to strengthen the Japanese economy and the overall role of Japan in the
region through remilitarisation and an early Peace Treaty with the US (Kern
1949). Consequently, the policy on excessive concentration of economic power in
Japan became the first target of the Reverse Course. Later on, the reformists
obtained a Peace Treaty and security agreements that would anchor the US in
Japan and configure the East Asian security landscape, with Japan as a junior
partner in the defence of American interests in the region.
In contrast to Japan, the reconstruction of Iraq was faced with strong security
challenges from the outset. While the purpose of the occupation and the
reconstruction was the same as in Japan, i.e. the creation of a new historical bloc
built on liberal capitalism aiming at turning Iraq into a country friendly to US
interests; there was a blatant lack of a cementing ideology that could make such
a new historical bloc successful. Indeed, while the new structures of a capitalistic
Iraq were painfully set up, democratic institutions aiming at diffusing ideas and
values that would coalesce the Iraqi state and civil society, and hence secure
hegemony for the new US-sponsored ruling class, were violently questioned by
strata of the Iraqi population. Three years after the invasion, the conditions to
see a successful creation of a new historical bloc were still absent in Iraq,
prompting the US administration to review its policies and to adopt the New
Way Forward.
The New Way Forward: Bringing Together a Winning Team
By the end of 2006, sectarian deaths in Iraq were soaring and little was done by
the Coalition and the Iraqi government to stop the haemorrhage. Consequently,
the US administration presented the New Way Forward in January 2007,
constituting a response to failures resulting from an early transfer of security
responsibilities to Iraqi forces or a belated response to growing sectarian
violence. It designed a new campaign plan lasting until July 2008. A fundamental
change in the Bush administration’s thinking occurred: national reconciliation
would not be the product of a nationwide agreement of what Iraq should look like
but would come from a long and piecemeal process involving all actors; while
Iraqi forces have developed their capacities, they are not ready to act
independently; Iran and Syria are pointed out as troublemakers in Iraq and
should be confronted by the US; and the stability of Iraq is an international and
regional issue which calls for further diplomatic efforts to involve key interna-
tional and regional actors (National Security Council 2007, pp. 79).
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Hence, the main elements of the New Way Forward included: to increase
American force levels by more than 20,000 troops to support Iraqi Security Forces
‘to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local
population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of
providing the security that Baghdad needs’, the reinforcement of the Iraqi state’s
monopoly on force through strengthening its military and police forces, the
implementation of infrastructure reconstruction and economic programmes
aiming at giving ‘every Iraqi citizen a stake in the country’s economy’, and the
organisation of democratic elections and a review of laws that contributed to
ethnic and religious tensions in Iraq (de-Baathification and oil revenues
essentially) (Bush 2007).
To these local measures, the US administration, following the recommenda-
tions of the Iraq Study Group, developed a new form of engagement with Iraq’s
neighbours. A two-track policy involved containing Syria and Iran, the main
purveyors of weapons to Sunni and Sh’ia militias in Iraq, while engaging the other
Arab states to financially support the economic recovery and help the political
unity of Iraq (Petraeus 2007). Finally, both local and regional items of the New
Way Forward are ensconced in broader security foreign policy considerations that
underline the ideological nature of the fight the US is leading in the Middle East, a
fight between moderation, freedom and democracy on one side and extremism
on the other, a fight between good and evil (Bush 2007).
For G.W. Bush, the entire rationale sustaining the American war in Iraq rests
ultimately on the idea that stability in the Middle East, achieved through the
promotion of democratic ideals in the region, will be conducive to regional
stability and friendliness to the US, hence contributing to global stability and
status quo with the US in the driver’s seat (Bush 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003,
Gordon 2003).
Putting its ‘organic intellectuals’ to work, the Bush administration set out to
review its policies in Iraq, adopting a more holistic approach to the problems
faced on the ground. Indeed, there was a shift from an exclusive focus
on answering violence with coercion and new instruments of power based on
generating consent were used. Coercion and consent were to work in association
in order to restore conditions conducive to the creation of a new historical bloc
favouring the US project of turning Iraq into a capitalistic and democratic state
friendly to US regional interests.
Embodying these objectives, the New Way Forward is the result of broad
consultations by G.W. Bush following the failure of his previous policies. Two
trends emerged from the discussions. On the one hand, some advisers were not in
favour of sending more troops to Iraq but recommended putting the emphasis
on training the Iraqi military, economic recovery, political reconciliation and on
taking into consideration the consequences of new strategies on and the reaction
of Iraq’s neighbours. On the other hand, some experts on Iraq, while also lauding
a more comprehensive approach to the Iraqi maelstrom, were in favour of
buttressing the American military presence in Iraq through what was to be called
the Surge. This opinion was supported by a report published by Frederick Kagan
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from the American Enterprise Institute, Choosing Victory*A Plan for Success in
Iraq (Kagan 2007).
A comparison between the AEI report and the NSC’s 2007 Iraq Strategy Review
shows similarities regarding the strategy to be adopted, with its emphasis on
sending more troops, and some differences regarding the sources of violence
in Iraq, the NSC Strategic Review including Iran and Syria as destabilising factors
on top of Iraqi domestic elements (National Security Council 2007, Kagan 2007).
In contrast to the role of the ACJ in Japan, the AEI’s recommendations focused on
the security sphere, while the ACJ’s programme permeated the four dimensions
of the reconstruction effort (security, state, economy and civil society). The Bush
administration, while understanding the AEI’s argument that progress in the
security sphere conditioned progress in the other fields of the reconstruction,
also appreciated that it was necessary to move away from the exclusive use of
coercion to tame the insurgency. Indeed, what makes the New Way Forward
interesting, and similar to the Reverse Course, is the comprehensive coverage of
the challenges faced in Iraq; the adoption of policies mixing coercion and consent
in expressing power, and in tune with each other across the four fields of
reconstruction; and, the reconnection of the reconstruction strategy with long-
term regional and global US foreign policy objectives: global and regional
stability contributing to the furtherance of the US at the helm of a democratic
capitalist global order.
The next section investigates the content and achievements of the Reverse
Course and the New Way Forward making use of Gramsci’s concepts of power,
the state, and the historical bloc; and we look at how consistent these policies
were in their implementation in the four fields of reconstruction, and with US
regional and global foreign policies.
Reconstructing Japan and Iraq
Gramsci: Power and the Historical Bloc
Gramsci bases his definition of power on the concept of ‘dual perspective’,
defined as ‘the dialectical unity of the moments of force and consent in political
action’ (Gramsci 1971, p. 169). The dual perspective can be reduced to two
fundamental levels that represent the dual nature of power as expressed by
Machiavelli’s Centaur, half-animal and half-human (Machiavelli 2004, p. 74). It is
what Gramsci defines as ‘the levels of force and consent, authority and
hegemony, violence and civilisation’ (Gramsci 1971, p. 169). This concept avows
that as long as the consensual aspect of power is at the forefront, hegemony
prevails. Force should only be used in rare deviant cases as most of the time
conformity of behaviour is ensured by the prevalent hegemony. Thus such a
concept of power differentiates between consent, and its corollary hegemony,
and force and its translation into domination. Hegemony does not mean the
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eradication of coercion, as it is always latent though undesirable to use. On top
of the dual perspective, it is necessary to look at two other concepts at the core
of a Gramscian approach to power that prove useful here: the state and historical
bloc, as well as how these concepts relate to power and how they can prove
useful in analysing reconstruction projects.
The state in its broad Gramscian definition consists in civil society (sphere of
private interests) and political society (state apparatus), hence ‘not merely the
governmental apparatus, but also the ‘‘private’’ apparatus of hegemony or civil
society’ (Gramsci 1971, p. 261). It includes the traditional view of the
administrative, executive, and coercive apparatus of government coupled with
the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society, elements such as the
church, the educational system, the press, and briefly ‘all the institutions which
helped to create in people certain modes of behaviour and expectations
consistent with the hegemonic social order’ (Cox 1996, p. 126). To be successful,
policies of power, expressed through coercion and consent, must be deployed in
the civil and political society.
Accordingly, there is a continuous interplay between the actor seeking to
generate consent to its power exercise, and targeted subordinate actor(s). The
interplay aims at the identification, aggregation and incorporation of subordi-
nates’ vital interests into the policies of the prevailing class, the whole
procedure being wrapped in institutions and processes constituting a canvas
preserving the stability and cohesion of the system. This is what Gramsci calls a
historical bloc, at the core of his notion of hegemony and defined as:
‘Structures and superstructures form an ‘‘historical bloc’’. That is to say the
complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the
reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production’ (Gramsci 1971,
p. 366). The historical bloc is brought into existence by the presence of a
hegemonic social class. Its main function is to maintain cohesion and identity
within the bloc through the propagation of a common culture. A social class is
hegemonic if it manages to bring the subordinated masses to agree with its own
ideas, values and interests, and, more important, if it manages to present them
as universal, meaning in the general interest of the diverse social formations on
which hegemony is implemented. This implementation takes place by giving
some satisfaction to the subordinate groups while not jeopardising the interests
of the ruling class (Cox 1996, p. 132). But coercion is a key ingredient of a
successful policy of consent generation as ‘normal conditions of ideological
subordination of the masses*the day-to-day routines of a parliamentary
democracy*are themselves constituted by a silent, absent force which gives
them their currency: the monopoly of legitimate violence by the State’
(Anderson 1976, p. 43).
In the making of a new historical bloc, both coercion and consent work hand-
in-hand as the analysis of the Reverse Course and the New Way Forward will now
illustrate.
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The Reverse Course
The first act of the Reverse Course unfolded in the economic dimension of the
reconstruction, but was expanded later on to reconstruction of the state and civil
society. In Gramscian language, the Americans set up a new historical bloc built
on the preservation of a Japanese capitalistic economy and, ideologically, on a
Japanese state and civil society expressing strong anti-Communism and a
corollary adherence to democracy. The Reverse Course was the product of
worrying Washington officials and an American business elite who feared that the
economic de-concentration programme in Japan ‘has been or may be carried too
far’ and might interfere with economic recovery and self-sustenance (US
Department of State/FRUS 1972, pp. 320323, GHQ/SCAP 1990b, p. 22),
identified as ‘socialistic and contrary to Anglo-Saxon philosophy’ (US Senate
1947, pp. 1180911811) and going far beyond the necessary objective of
eliminating trusts and cartels in Japan (Schaller 1985, pp. 117118, 197200,
207, GHQ/SCAP 1990a, p. 22). In 1948, the Draper economic mission in Japan
concluded that it was necessary to eliminate extreme forms of economic
concentration in Japan without hindering production, which meant restoring
the Japanese capitalistic class and securing a conservative government, while
containing the left (Schonberger 1977, p. 197). The seeds of a new historical bloc
with Japanese conservatives sympathetic to American capitalist interests at its
core were thus sown.
Consequently, the official turn of the American reconstruction policy in Japan
encompassed: no further extension of the purge; further planned reduction of
the costs of the occupation borne by the Japanese government; economic
recovery of Japan as a primary objective of US policy; no pre-censorship of the
Japanese press; the development of medium and long wave radio broadcasts
from Okinawa to enhance the appreciation of American ideas by the Japanese;
the rapid conclusion of wartime trials; and, finally, the availability of Northeast
Asia to Japan’s needs and trade, loss of which through Communist victory in
China and then Southeast Asia would be a serious setback, as Japan’s recovery
badly needed trade opportunities (Kennan 1948, pp. 691696, US Department of
State/Policy Planning Staff 1981, pp. 180182, CIA I 1982, Reel 2, SWNCC and
SANACC 1977, Reel 31).
With the Soviet control on atomic weapons assured in September, the
Communist victory in China in October 1949 and with the beginning of the
Korean War in June 1950, the Reverse Course unfolded without much resistance.
The time was ripe for the launching of a red purge and generally a tougher stance
against the left in Japan that would assure the alignment of Japanese society
with the American project by eradicating alternatives, and secure economic
recovery. Political, economic and civil society re-engineering were led in a
consistent fashion, further participating in the attainment of the American final
objective: making Japan a capitalist economy, led by an elite supporting
American regional and global interests, a new historical bloc buttressing
American hegemony. The freedom of movement granted to the Japanese
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political and economic elite would thus be matched by a reduction of liberties
and political expression in the civil society, exemplified by the suppression of the
right to strike in the public services and the eradication of the Communist
political presence in all strata of Japanese political and civil society (Cohen
1987, pp. 449452, OSS/State Department undated b, Reel 5, no. 40). Well-
orchestrated anti-Communist propaganda managed to secure the consent of the
Japanese people to this sudden change of policy. From democratisation and
demilitarisation to economic reconstruction and radicalisation of the struggle
against Communism, the American policy realised a U-turn that seemed almost
insane to many Japanese as the Korean War broke out.
The war next door was a gift from the Gods for Japan (Dower 1979, p. 424), as
the US called on Japan to produce the materials needed to fight the Communist
invasion. It would also have another controversial outcome: the remilitarisation
of Japan and the conclusion of a Peace Treaty and Security Agreement placing
Japan as the most Western frontier of the United States, as the bulwark of
American security in the region, the first line of defence against Communism.
Japan became a huge factory to help the economic recovery of East Asia, and
a massive American base destined to contain the Soviet Union (Dower 1999,
pp. 541546).
In addition to the re-creation of Japanese political and civil society and
economy, the US embarked on reviewing its position regarding the military power
of Japan, aiming at buttressing its security in the region and hence its control
over East Asia. In fact, the security aspects of the reconstruction of Japan
constituted the last building block of the US-led reinvention of its former enemy.
So far, the reconstruction of the state, the economy and the civil society have
been investigated and the conclusion is that, thanks to the consistency between
policies implemented in these three fields, the reconstruction of Japan was
rather effective, even though Communist ideas were still propagated in Japan. By
addressing the question of Japan’s domestic and regional security, the US would
achieve new levels of consistency between policies of reconstruction and its
regional and global foreign policies. This consistency of action between
reconstruction policies, international and regional realities and US foreign policy
objectives led to the effective reconstruction of Japan in the long run, with the
casting of Japan as an unconditional American ally in the region, contributing to
the achievement of the ultimate US foreign policy objective: maintaining its
position of strength in East Asia, and hence contributing to global US supremacy.
Regarding Asia and particularly Japan, America opted for a development of global
and regional economic complementarities in order to repel Communism and to
trigger economic growth. NSC 48 embodied this new approach. The document
warned that if Japan felt into the Soviet sphere of influence, it would shift the
balance of world power to the disadvantage of America. To meet this menace,
Washington opted for the promotion of democratic forces and economic stability
through economic assistance, the development of economic relations between
Japan and other free countries of the world, and US support against
external aggression (National Security Council 1987, Reel 2, p. 6). NSC 48 also
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recommended the opening of Southeast Asia to Japan for raw materials and
exports. Japan was to become the factory of Asia, the main force for regional
economic development, which would lead to the strengthening of social and
political stability in a region open to American economic interests and
contributing to US security interests (National Security Council 1987, Reel 2,
pp. 2425).
The outbreak of the Korean War accelerated Japan’s transformation. Globally,
it forced Truman to adopt NSC 68, the core text of the Cold War policy
formulating the doctrine of containment of the USSR. Regionally, Japan became
the first beneficiary of the war, and witnessed an economic boom stimulated by
US ‘special procurements’ (Joint Strategic Plans Committee 1951, Reel 6). The
Korean War kick-started the Japanese economy and launched it on the path to
success, which in turn allowed for the overall success of the reconstruction
policies thanks to the economic gains enjoyed by Japan. ‘Special procurements’
brought an estimated $2.3 billion into Japan between June 1950 and the end of
1953. Moreover, between 1954 and 1956, ‘new special procurements’ added
another $1.75 billion. This enabled Japan to increase its imports and to double
the scale of production in key industries (Dower 1999, p. 542). Boosted
economically, Japan was also bestowed a key role in the re-definition of US
foreign policy through the doctrine of containment, seeking ‘global situations of
strength’. Japan was one of these and as such the reconstruction of the country
became critical. Hence, it had to be integrated coherently into the general
framework of US foreign policy definition. The security and economic fields of
the reconstruction effort intersected as the security gains made by the US thanks
to the economic reinforcement of Japan were matched by the wealth and
consent to US policies generated amongst the Japanese elite and general
population.
The remilitarisation of Japan was subsequently dealt with through a Peace
Treaty and Security Agreement aiming at keeping Japan oriented to the West;
denying Japan to the USSR in time of peace or war; securing the availability of
Japanese bases for US military operations in the event of war; and making
Japan’s war potential available to the US (US Department of State/FRUS 1976,
1389, US Department of State 1955, p. 3171).
Japan was all but a satellite of the United States. Its economy was reliant on
US imports of Japanese goods, its security was totally dependent on the presence
of American forces based in the region and its army was exclusively equipped,
trained and at the disposal of the US. The democratisation that characterised the
early reconstruction of Japan was put on hold and the former political and
economic elite back in power. In a sense, the US sacrificed the genuine
development of a democratic society in Japan on the altar of American regional
and global security and supremacy. Ironically, it is one of the key factors
explaining the effectiveness of the reconstruction of Japan. However, from an
American point of view, such a policy was consistent with the overall objective of
reinforcing US supremacy in East Asia and its global status as a superpower.
The welfare and security of the American political and economic elites
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took precedence over a genuine exercise of democracy. The collusion that
characterised the subsequent relations between American and Japanese capit-
alism and political elites is testimony to the success of the overall American
project of reconstructing Japan and of the creation of a new historical bloc
congenial to US interests.
The story in Iraq would be rather different. Three years after inefficient
reconstruction policies and in the face of seeing its project of cementing a new
historical bloc preserving American interests in the Middle East, the US
administration eventually decided to review its approach and delivered a new
strategy that was to prove more efficient in its conceptualisation, objectives and
implementation.
Flexibility and Adaptability, the New Way Forward
The New Way Forward acknowledges the multidimensional character of the
challenges facing the reconstruction of Iraq and consequently produces a strategy
whose four components are inter-related and mutually reinforcing as well as being
aware of the need to review the regional US posture in the Middle East in order to
address the Iranian and Syrian threats to Iraqi stability (Petraeus 2007, 2008, The
Economist 2008a, p. 8). On top of more multilateralism and more engagement with
Iraq’s neighbours, the New Way Forward is developed around four axes.
Firstly, the security dimension is deemed essential for progress to be made in
other fields. Consequently, the Bush administration operated the so-called Surge,
sending an additional 37,000 American troops to Iraq. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) and Department of Defense (DoD) reports from June 2008 show that
after the Surge started the violence sharply decreased from 180 recorded attacks
per day in June 2007 to 45 attacks in May 2008, even though Baghdad remains highly
volatile and recurrent sectarian and militia-led violence plagued Basra during spring
2008 (GAO 2008, pp. 1113). The Surge mainly aimed at wresting sanctuaries from
Al-Qaeda control and facing up to Iranian-supported militia extremists. Tactically, it
put the emphasis on counterinsurgency practices, underscoring the importance of
units living among the people they are securing through joint security stations and
patrols with the Iraqi Security Forces, the overall goal of the operation being ‘to
pursue Al Qaeda-Iraq, to combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local
reconciliation, and to enable political and economic progress’ (Petraeus 2008,
p. 1). The Surge aims at creating conditions conducive to successful reconstruction
projects having a quick and direct impact on Iraqis.
Indeed, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) launched large reconstruc-
tion projects aiming at restoring and developing Iraqi infrastructure, especially
regarding essential services. The New Way Forward, through the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), argues that smaller reconstruction projects
showing rapid benefits to the population are essential to succeed. Aiming at
delivering quicker results in order to show Iraqis that reconstruction was
progressing, the Department of State launched the PRTs in November 2005, ‘to
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lead the decentralizing of U.S. reconstruction and capacity-building efforts’
(SIGIR 2008, p. 81). The idea was to develop local actions aiming at capacity-
building of local governments, through inter-agency teams working on building
provincial, municipal and local capacity in dealing with central government and
citizens. In addition, micro-loans to develop the economy locally were delivered,
programmes aiming at strengthening the rule of law were implemented and steps
were taken to promote national reconciliation by building bridges between
communities (USAID 2007, p. 5).
In addition, with the January 2007 Surge, complementing the 10 existing PRTs,
15 embedded PRTs (embedded with military brigade combat teams) were
created, being active mainly in programmes aiming at gaining the loyalty of
the local population. The objective was to encourage the support of moderate
elements seeking peaceful ways of resolving political differences (SIGIR 2007,
p. 75, 2008, p. 81). They implemented local governance programmes aimed at
training new locally elected individuals on issues like governance, public finance,
and city planning and reconstruction project management.
In October 2007, SIGIR released an audit on PRTs’ results and concluded that
they were making incremental progress. On governance, progress was being
made but there was a need to see the enactment of the Provincial Powers Law to
define the rights and responsibilities of government offices and to hold provincial
officials accountable for their actions. The rule of law proves more difficult to
work on as there is a lack of coordination between police and the judiciary on top
of permanent security issues involving threats made to judges. Reconstruction
projects were usually efficiently dealt with by Iraqi provincial officials, including
budget execution, but there was a lack of human and material resources for
maintaining infrastructures. National reconciliation showed little progress,
except in Anbar where local tribes rallied to face Al-Qaeda and support the
national government. As SIGIR explains, ‘efforts toward reconciliation have been
undermined by tension between rival Shia groups, a sense of alienation among
Sunnis, and growing public frustration over the inability to obtain government
services’ (SIGIR 2007, p. 160).
In addition to fostering good governance with local officials, the PRTs worked
with Iraqi civil society organisations in a similar fashion. The focus was on
‘empowering women, youth issues, business development, agriculture and
agribusiness and advocacy work for a democratic and tolerant Iraq’ (USAID
2007, p. 7). PRTs also buttressed and organised the Sunni ‘Awakening Movement’
in Anbar and the Concerned Local Citizens across Iraq, leading to further security
gains. Finally, to help areas in which insurgents are particularly active, and hence
which are finding it harder to benefit from the reconstruction projects, the US
government developed the Community Stabilization Program (CSP), with the
objective of restoring economic and social stability in communities affected by
insurgent activity, while concurrently building the foundation for long-term
development. Its main mode of action consists in addressing the youth through
the creation of employment and skills development programmes. The CSP uses
public works activities to integrate ethnically and religiously diverse youth, while
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fostering tolerance and managing conflict, which in turn limits the risk of seeing
idle youth accepting money from terrorists or insurgents to attack Coalition and
Iraqi Security Forces (USAID 2007, p. 16).
In parallel to the Surge and its civilian component aiming at better
performances for reconstruction projects, the New Way Forward insists on
developing further Iraqi capacity in the field of security. A June 2008 DoD report
states that 478,000 Iraqi security personnel have been trained since late 2003 and
that Iraqi forces have performed well in numerous operations (US Department of
Defense 2008, p. 35). However, a GAO (2008, p. 27) report tempers the DoD’s
optimism by shedding light on the actual level of readiness of the ISF to perform
security tasks on their own, qualifying it as showing ‘limited improvement’. The
report highlights the low level of autonomy regarding logistical capabilities and
combat support, the lack of a single unified force, the sectarian and militia
influence impeding some operations, and training and leadership shortages (GAO
2008, pp. 2931). However, as mentioned above, some Sunnis turned away from
the insurgency and from support for Al-Qaeda in Iraq to form the Sons of Iraq
(numbering 91,000 under contract in April 2008). The movement started with
Sunni awakening, rejecting the indiscriminate violence of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and
aware that it will be difficult to share in Iraq’s wealth if they do not contribute in
the political arena. However, questions remain regarding the increased risk of
insurgent infiltration in their ranks, and the need to have a coherent transfer
mechanism for those former insurgents into Iraqi institutions or civilian life.
A second key component of the Way Forward is constituted by national
reconciliation efforts through the enactment of key legislation. So far four laws
addressing Sunni concerns have been enacted: the de-Ba’athification reform allowing
lower-ranking members of the party to return to government jobs, but its
implementation stalled; the amnesty of certain detainees, especially Sunnis and
Sadrists detained without trial (but the law does not cover all detainees);
a provincial powers law formalising the sharing of power between national, provincial
and local governments; and the Provincial Elections law, providing electoral rules in
order to organise new elections aiming at forming provincial councils more
representative of the population they serve. All four laws seek to open avenues to
Sunni participation in Iraqi political life and hence are critical to national
reconciliation. However, two other essential pieces of legislation have not pro-
gressed. The Hydrocarbon law is in the process of being drafted and three of its four
provisions are still pending. Finally, little progress has been made on the disarmament
and demobilisation of militia, essentially due the lack of a secure environment, the
inclusion of all parties in negotiations, and appropriate reintegration opportunities.
So far, none of these conditions are met (GAO 2008, pp. 3440, 2009, p. 9). In addition
to these critical laws, the review of the October 2005 Constitution has not progressed.
Three contentious issues are still being debated: the power of the presidency; the
status of disputed areas, especially Kirkuk; and the relative power among federal,
regional and provincial governments (GAO 2008, pp. 4243).
The third pillar of the New Way Forward is to make sure that the Iraqi
government executes its capital investment budgets, essential as most US
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reconstruction projects are nearing completion. The inability of the Iraqi
government to use its considerable resources is essentially due to the lack of
security, a shortage of trained staff; and weak procurement and budgeting
systems. Consequently, the US has provided the Iraqi ministries with training
programmes and embedded advisors to help them spend their resources.
However, these efforts are not integrated as various US agencies lead their
own programmes (GAO 2008, pp. 4349, 2009, pp. 78).
Finally, the fourth component of the new US strategy consists in improving the
delivery of essential services to the Iraqi population. However, low spending rates
in the sectors of oil production, electricity generation and water, the lack of an
integrated energy strategy, endemic corruption, continuous security issues, and
lack of Iraqi expertise in maintenance did not allow for substantial progress to be
made (GAO 2008, p. 53).
Since the implementation of the New Way Forward, some progress was made
in all areas of reconstruction. Gradually, the Iraqi state is getting stronger; civil
society is developing and learning how to contribute constructively in the
country’s development, while also learning how to voice its concerns regarding
the state. In the most important field of security, Iraqis have made incremental
progress and the Coalition has accelerated the transfer of security duties to ISF in
the eighteen provinces. However, when needed, the Coalition remains ready to
support ISF operations. The economy is progressing steadily, driven by high oil
prices and thanks to better security conditions, reconstruction projects are
moving on faster, creating more jobs and wealth. On the political front, while
much still needs to be done, critical legislation has been enacted, gradually
clearing the path to national reconciliation.
However, much remains to be done to be able to qualify the US project of
reconstructing Iraq as successful. Indeed, while all indicators regarding violence
levels regressed, it is still endemic in Iraq. Al-Qaeda, while diminished, is not
vanquished, and die-hard Sunni insurgents are still active. The Sunni and Shia
militias remain an issue and a potentially very serious source of violence,
especially towards Iraqi civilians. Security conditions thus remain volatile and
dangerous across Iraq, with continuous religious and ethnic violence leading to
further displacement of population in and out of Iraq, hence depriving the
country of a whole layer of technocrats and professionals (such as doctors,
nurses, teachers), who, because they belonged to the ‘right’ religious group, had
the chance to develop skills under the previous regime (GAO 2008, p. 16).
While it is still too early to predict the final outcome of postwar reconstruction
in Iraq, the US government, through the New Way Forward, seems to have
managed to develop a reconstruction strategy that takes into account all
dimensions of what post-conflict reconstruction entails. Policies and actions in
the four fields of the reconstruction move in parallel and consistency of action is
a key parameter for US officials in order to measure progress. In Gramscian
terms, some sort of balance has been achieved between means of power relying
on coercion and expressions of power favouring consent. In areas where coercive
instruments of power have cleared the path to the institutionalisation of new
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relations between the US-sponsored elite and the population, the foundations of
a new historical bloc enshrining liberalism and capitalism have started to solidify.
Gradually, active coercion is being displaced by passive, or what we could term
‘preservationist’ coercion, and policies generating consent to the new order.
Conclusions: Assessing the Reverse Course and the New Way Forward
In the final section of this article, the findings are summarised and a judgement
ventured on the outcome of the US policies in Japan and Iraq. To do so, the three
key analytical tools are put at the centre of the appraisal: power as coercion and
consent, consistency of action across the four fields of reconstruction, and
consistency of action between policies of reconstruction and regional and global
US foreign policies.
In Japan, the United States maximised its use of power instruments, mixing
coercion and consent with consistency, and also ensured that reconstruction
policies implemented in the four fields were complementary. Moreover,
reconstruction policies were congruent with regional and global American foreign
policies, as the reverse course of 1947 illustrated. Regarding the reconstruction
of the Japanese state, the democratisation first took a punitive shape with a
purge programme aimed at the elites responsible for the war. The purge was
generally welcomed by the Japanese public, especially since it did not concern
removing the Emperor. The forces constituting the political and civil societies
were then co-opted into the project of creating a new Japan. Here, the Japanese
national trait of looking for strong leadership played a role in the successful
outcome of the political reforms. The leadership provided by the Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers/General Headquarters (SCAP/GHQ) proved
instrumental in the dissemination and incorporation of democratic modes of
action at all levels of Japanese society. Regarding the economy, the economic
reconstruction of Japan was designed to complement the political reinvention of
the country. Economic freedom and free trade went alongside political
democratisation. Both were in permanent interaction and reinforced each
other’s achievements. At the end of the process, Japan was a liberal capitalist
country backed by American economic power. The United States managed to lead
Japan and its people on a path of economic development that would exclude any
chance of unrest due to poor economic conditions. The overwhelming American
economic power allowed for the US to support the Japanese recovery and
integrate Japan in its economic sphere, contributing to its rise to the status of
second biggest economy in the world. On the subject of the re-moulding
of Japanese civil society, the occupation did manage to win the hearts and
minds of the Japanese people and American values were embraced without much
resistance. While tradition remained central to the life of the Japanese, the path
to progress that opened after the end of the war was without doubt made in
America. Political and economic liberalism became the norm for the Japanese,
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who, without renouncing their sense of group belonging, learned individualism
through the integration of individual liberties in their daily lives. At the end of
the occupation, the democratisation of the country was a success. Of course, the
realities that sprang from the Cold War tempered these achievements as the
reverse course illustrated, but the authoritarianism and militarist ideology that
plagued Japan were all but eradicated. In the realm of security, the position of
the United States in 1945 was unmatched. During the democratisation process in
Japan, it always loomed in the background. The massive presence of US military
personnel and material in Japan reminded the Japanese every day that resistance
was futile. Moreover, security considerations and the beginning of the Cold War
enhanced such a perception as the Japanese witnessed the military build-up that
turned their country into an American fortress. At the end of the reconstruction
process, the Japanese political, educational, cultural and economic institutions
were re-moulded according to an American model. In all fields the Occupation
authorities oriented Japan towards American values and interests. By the end of
the occupation, Japan’s institutional landscape was democratic and liberal.
Moreover, Japan was integrated into the regional and global institutional
frameworks initiated by the United States and became the cornerstone of
American regional policy in East Asia.
Indeed, the effectiveness of reconstruction in the four fields was also matched
by consistency of US foreign policies with reconstruction policies. Due to the
need to contain the rise of Communism, Japan was eventually invited by the
United States to join the military effort in the struggle against the Soviet Union.
Even though the military was discredited, the fact that Japan was allowed to
develop a self-defence force contributed to the renaissance of Japanese national
pride as sovereignty was regained. The remilitarisation of Japan was then sold to
its neighbours through a series of military agreements with Asian nations aiming
at calming their fears of a potential resurgence of Japan as a military power. In
the years that followed, the United States, thanks to its military presence in
Japan became a major power in East Asia, which in turn contributed to the
maintenance of its status as global superpower. Moreover, the US designated
Japan as being at the heart of US security interests in the region, turning Japan
into a key ally. Such a redefinition of Japan’s role led to the implementation of an
anti-Communist programme across all spheres of the reconstruction effort,
turning Japan into a conservative democratic and capitalist country, whose elite
would consistently align themselves on US interests, hence contributing to the
reinforcement of the US strategic position in East Asia, and thus buttressing
the US global position of power.
Put against the definition of success by the American administration, it seems
that the Reverse Course was a rather efficient venture. All the objectives set by
the administration were achieved and Japan became and still is a faithful ally
of the United States. The United States carefully planned and staffed the
reconstruction process, took care of contingencies, and precisely defined the
role of Japan in the American sphere of influence. It was successful because the US
made efficient use of nuances of power, avoiding contradictions in its use across
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the fields of reconstruction. It was successful because every single realisation of
the reconstruction process aimed at one objective: the maintenance and
reinforcement of American supremacy in East Asia and globally in the face of
the rise of its challenger and rival ideology, the Communist USSR. The reconstruc-
tion of Japan was integrated fully in the definition of American foreign
policy objectives and as such benefited from high levels of coherence in its
implementation.
In Iraq, since January 2007, marking the beginning of the New Way Forward,
reconstruction policies were altered and became more complementary. While
the Surge put more boots on the ground, counter-insurgency tactics changed
from ‘find, fix, finish’ to ‘clear, hold, build’. Indeed, in the wake of the
securitisation of a neighbourhood, local expert teams made up of American
advisers and Iraqis move in quickly, protect the population, identify critical
needs, start up reconstruction projects, and improve governance, in order to
isolate insurgents. Coercion and consent walk hand-in-hand. Coercion establishes
the conditions conducive to generating consent, which in turn leads to the
stabilisation of the area. Gradually, bringing a sense of normality to the
population allows the reconstruction of the country to move on. As of today,
compared to two years ago, critical advances have been made in the security,
political, economic and civil society fields. While fragile, these advances are
permanently reinforced and Iraq is now moving on.
Finally, we argued that consistency of regional and global foreign policies with
reconstruction policies deployed in the four dimensions of the reconstruction
constitute another explanatory factor of the outcome of a post-conflict
reconstruction project. In Iraq, we saw that early US foreign policies failed to
address the regional issues caused by the invasion of Iraq. Iran and Syria, both key
regional actors, were not engaged with by the US administration, causing both
countries to support Iraqi factions in their opposition to the American presence.
However, following the New Way Forward, tactical progress made in Iraq was
reinforced by a review of the US foreign policy posture regarding reconstruction.
New levels of consistency are now achieved regionally as the US gets more
engaged with Iran and Syria, both responsible for the flow of fighters and
material support to terrorists and insurgents. By recently opening the door to
negotiations with Iran on the status of its nuclear programme, the US gives itself
a narrow space for linking both issues. If Iran is more amenable, it will benefit
Iraq, and the US project as a whole. Globally, the US recently adopted a lower
profile regarding its status as global superpower. Of course, one can argue that
US military capabilities are over-stretched and hence Washington had better
not flex its muscles again (Wallerstein 2002, Mann 2004, Todd 2004). However, it
seems that the Bush administration understood that the Iraq reconstruction
would be better off if treated multilaterally. The International Compact on Iraq
brought together the international community under the IMF and UN umbrella,
and structures the international support to Iraq since May 2007, gradually leading
the country’s integration in the global economy and international community
(International Compact with Iraq 2008).
POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION 61
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Br
id
ou
x,
 J
ef
f]
[A
be
ry
st
wy
th
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
9:
08
 1
8 
Ap
ri
l 
20
11
The new Iraqi state has not failed yet. Despite its shortcomings, the permanent
struggle between parties to control ministries including through the use of their
militias, the endemic corruption, and the lack of skills and experience of
bureaucrats, the Iraqi state is reinforcing itself and has started, whilst under
American tutelage, to perform its duties towards the Iraqi population. As Toby
Dodge argues, the Iraqi ‘state is beginning to re-cohere’ (quoted in The Economist
2008b, p. 30).
So, if we put the American objectives of regime change in Iraq against gains
made since the reconstruction began, did the US reach its goals? Regarding WMD,
it did, not because invading US forces found and dismantled them but because
they simply were not there. In the absence of weapons of mass destruction, the
second US goal consisting in cutting Ba’athist support to terrorist groups was also
reached, the worst case scenario seemingly disappearing. Again, as of today
nothing proves that Saddam was ever actively supporting terrorist groups.
Toppling Saddam Hussein and replacing him with a democratic regime friendly
to the US and its regional interests became a foreign policy objective after the
invasion. Is Iraq a democracy today? More importantly, is it supporting the US in
the Middle East? The first question would require a whole book dedicated to it.
However, elections did take place, were deemed fair and Iraq has now an
institutional structure contributing to democracy anchorage in the country.
Moreover, it seems that the US managed to avoid the exclusive dominance of an
Islamic party in Iraq, a concern that agitated CPA and American officials from the
beginning of the reconstruction project. In addition, democracy is further
reinforced by Iraqi civil society, actively developing, and starting to play its
role as guardian of democratic gains made. So, if referring to a restrictive classic
liberal definition of democracy with its emphasis on procedural and electoral
democratic governance, one can argue that Iraq did achieve some measure of
progress towards democracy.
However, five years into the reconstruction, Iraq is not supporting US
regional interests. By the look of it, access to oil will be heavily controlled
by the regions, and less by the central government, and US oil firms will not be
alone in winning contracts. The Iraqi government is gaining in capacity and
resources and is now more daring. The other ‘unofficial’ objective consisting in
enhancing US physical control in the Middle East is thwarted by the Iraqi
government’s insistence on seeing all US forces leave Iraq by the end of 2011,
as enshrined in the November 2008 Agreement between the United States of
America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces
from Iraq and the Organization of their Activities during their Temporary
Presence in Iraq and the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relation of
Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the
Republic of Iraq, hence defeating the US objective of having a permanent US
military presence in Iraq.
Overall, the US-led reconstruction of Iraq is a failure regarding the defence of
US interests. On top of the astronomical amount of money spent by Washington
on the ‘war on terror’ and especially on reconstructing and controlling Iraq,
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America lost more than it gained in the venture. Indeed, with more than 4,000
killed and more than 30,000 wounded, the US is paying a heavy price in Iraq.
Moreover, to the loss in human and material resources, we can add the loss of
international sympathy which contributed to a questioning of US legitimacy as a
force for stability in the international system. Overall, the lack of consistency of
US policies in Iraq, in the Middle East and globally, essentially due to a
misunderstanding of the limits of power in the contemporary world, contributes
to a strategic weakening of the US global stance, and to questions over the status
and future use of American power.
The analysis of the reconstruction of Iraq, viewed through the lenses of the
concept of power, consistency of action of policies of reconstruction in the
security, political society, economy and civil society, and through integrating
inter-related influences of the local, regional and global levels of power
exertion, embodies the limits of the US conceptualisation of power and hence
questions the status and effectiveness of US power exertion as conceived by the
G.W. Bush administration.
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